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Abstract
Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes
of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents
honestly report their true demand in response to prices. A line of research in economics, initiated
by Hurwicz (1972), is devoted to understanding how such markets perform when agents are
strategic about their demands. This is captured by the Walrasian Mechanism that proceeds by
collecting reported demands, finding clearing prices in the reported market via an ascending price
taˆtonnement procedure, and returns the resulting allocation. Similar mechanisms are used, for
example, in the daily opening of the New York Stock Exchange and the call market for copper
and gold in London.
In practice, it is commonly observed that agents in such markets reduce their demand leading
to behaviors resembling bargaining and to inefficient outcomes. We ask how inefficient the
equilibria can be. Our main result is that the welfare of every pure Nash equilibrium of the
Walrasian mechanism is at least one quarter of the optimal welfare, when players have gross
substitute valuations and do not overbid. Previous analysis of the Walrasian mechanism have
resorted to large market assumptions to show convergence to efficiency in the limit. Our result
shows that approximate efficiency is guaranteed regardless of the size of the market.
We extend our results in several directions. First, our results extend to Bayes-Nash equilibria
and outcomes of no regret learning via the smooth mechanism framework. We also extend our
bounds to any mechanism that maximizes welfare with respect to the declared valuations and
never charges agents more than their bids. Additionally, we consider other classes of valuations
and bid spaces beyond those satisfying the gross substitutes conditions. Finally, we relax the
no-overbidding assumption, and present bounds that are parameterized by the extent to which
agents are willing to overbid.
1 Introduction
The manner in which market prices are set and adjusted is a central area of study in economic
theory. A formal approach to this topic was proposed by Walras [38], who defined the concept of
competitive (aka Walrasian) equilibrium: an assignment of prices to goods such that, when each
agent takes his preferred allocation under the given price vector, the market clears (i.e., all goods
are sold) and no good is over-demanded. An important property of the Walrasian equilibrium,
known as the First Welfare Theorem, states that whenever an equilibrium exists, the allocation is
efficient. Following Walras’ original work, the existence of such competitive equilibria for various
types of economies has been shown [20, 15], often accompanied by simple and distributed algorithmic
procedures to compute such prices [7, 26, 25].
The Walrasian equilibrium is suggestive of a process by which prices are adjusted in markets,
but it is also often used directly as a mechanism to allocate goods. Double auctions, which are
prevalent in finance, essentially work by computing a price that clear the market and executing
as many trades as possible at that price. The opening price of the New York Stock Exchange is
computed in such a way. The way the prices of copper and gold in London are adjusted follows a
similar procedure: the demands of agents are elicited and prices are computed according to such
equilibria. We refer to Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams [33] for a more extensive discussion.
It has been commonly observed that traders might strategically reduce their demands for certain
goods seeking more favourable prices. As Rustichini et al [33] write: “Such behavior, which is the
essence of bargaining, may lead to an impasse that delays or lessens the gains from trade.” This
leads to a natural question: to what extent does strategic behavior of economic agents, rather than
price-taking behavior, hurt the efficiency of a market?
Hurwicz [18] proposed a game-theoretical framework to analyze settings where agents are strate-
gic. In such model each economic agent is a player in a non-cooperative game and their strategy
is a report of their preferences. After reporting their preferences, which serves as a proxy for their
demands, the competitive equilibrium in the declared market determines allocation and payments
to the agents, who evaluate their outcome with respect to their true preferences. We will call this
the Walrasian Game or Walrasian Mechanism. Hurwicz [18] observes that truthfully reporting
preferences is not always an equilibrium of the Walrasian game. An initial characterization of equi-
libria was done by Hurwicz and then extended by Otani and Sicilian [27, 28], who showed that
inefficient outcomes arise as the equilibria of the Walrasian mechanism.
The previously mentioned work focuses on economies with divisible goods. For indivisible
goods, Gul and Stacchetti [15, 16] show that truthful revelation of demands is not in general
an equilibrium for the Walrasian Mechanism, except in the special cases of additive valuations (in
which it corresponds to isolated English auctions) and in the unit-demand case (which corresponds
to the ascending auction of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [10]). For generic gross substitute
valuations, no dynamic ascending price auction can be truthful [16].
A natural response to such observations is to seek conditions under which the equilibria of the
Walrasian game resemble the competitive equilibrium one would obtain from the truthful reports.
An intuition first formalized by Roberts and Postlewaite [30] is that in large markets, the ability of
each individual player to influence the market is minimal, so agents should approximately behave as
price-taking agents. They capture the concept of large markets through replica economies, i.e., they
consider the equilibria of a game where there are k identical copies of each agent and each good and
study the limit as k goes to infinity. The original result of Roberts and Postlewaite shows that the
incentives for the agents not to act as price-takers are vanishingly small in the size of the economy.
Jackson and Manelli [19] show that under some regularity conditions, the equilibrium allocations
in large markets will be close to the allocations in the competitive equilibrium. A version of this
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result for double auctions was later provided by Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams [33] and
Satterthwaite and Williams [34] for a simple market with unit-demand traders. Recently, Azevedo
and Budish [2] proposed the notion of strategyproof in the large that generalize this idea to other
strategic settings such as matching markets.
Our results In this paper we seek to provide efficiency guarantees for the equilibria of market-
clearing mechanisms, such as the Walrasian game, without resorting to large market assumptions.1
Since it is known that Nash equilibria of the Walrasian mechanism may be inefficient (Otani and
Scicilian [27]), we aim to show that all equilibria are approximately efficient, i.e., the ratio between
the welfare of an optimal allocation and the welfare of a Nash equilibrium is bounded. This ratio
is referred to as the Price of Anarchy of the game. Our main result is a bound on this ratio,
which unlike previous results, is independent on number of players, items or on any distributional
assumptions on the valuations.
We follow the model of Hurwicz [18] where the strategy of each player is a reported valuation
over the goods in the markets. We model goods as indivisible and heterogeneous items and assume
that players have combinatorial valuations over the goods. Our model of economy follows Gul and
Stachetti [15, 16] : we assume that each player is initially endowed with a sufficiently large amount
of money that neither budgets nor initial endowments influence the equilibrium outcome.
We begin by focusing specifically on the Walrasian mechanism. Recall that this mechanism
restricts the agents to report only valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property, which guar-
antees the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in the declared market (Gul and Stachetti [15])
and thereby ensures that the mechanism is well-defined. Our first result is that if the agents’ true
valuations satisfy the gross substitutes property, then for any Nash equilibrium in which no agent
bids in a way that exposes himself to the possibility of obtaining negative utility ex post2, the
equilibrium outcome generates welfare that is at least one fourth of the socially efficient outcome.
Moreover, there always exists at least one equilibrium satisfying the required property. This result
extends to mixed Nash and coarse correlated equilibria, as well as the Bayesian setting (incomplete
information). In particular, we show that the expected efficiency of any Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the Walrasian mechanism is at least one fourth of the expected optimal welfare. This extension
to incomplete information settings is done via the smooth mechanisms framework of Syrgkanis and
Tardos [37], which is based on Roughgarden’s notion of smooth games [31, 32].
The above results can be extended along multiple dimensions. First, we can relax the require-
ment that agents do not engage in “risky” bidding behavior, as follows. We parameterize the loss
in efficiency by the exposure factor, which is a measure of risk tolerance. We say that a strategy
has exposure factor γ if, by playing such strategy, an agent is guaranteed to never pay more than
(1 + γ) times his value for the items he receives, under any declarations of the other agents. We
show that, for the Walrasian mechanism, the ratio between the socially optimal welfare and the
equilibrium welfare will be at most (4 + 2γ) at any equilibrium in which each agent’s strategy has
exposure factor at most γ.
Additionally, our efficiency guarantees extend to circumstances in which the true preferences of
the agents do not satisfy the gross substitutes condition, but instead are drawn from more general
classes of valuation functions, such as submodular or fractionally subadditive valuations. That
is, even in circumstances where a Walrasian equilibrium does not exist with respect to the true
preferences of the agents, a mechanism that restricts the participants to report gross substitutes
valuations and then allocates according to a pricing equilibrium of the reported valuations will
1Our bounds apply even though, in small markets, the agents’ behaviour does not necessarily resemble price-taking.
2A sufficient condition for this property is that no agent declares more than his true value on any set of goods.
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achieve approximately welfare-maximizing outcomes at equilibrium. Indeed, we show that this
result holds even if the declared preferences are restricted even further to the class of additive
valuations.
Finally, our efficiency guarantees can be generalized to apply more broadly than the Walrasian
mechanism. Indeed, our results apply to any mechanism that chooses an allocation maximizing
the welfare of the declared valuations and charges prices no larger then the bids. It is trivial to
see that the Walrasian mechanism has these properties. Under this extension, our techniques can
be applied to other mechanisms such as the VCG mechanism and the ”pay-your-bid” mechanism
(which generates the welfare-optimal allocation but charges payments equal to the declared values
for goods received).
The application to the VCG mechanism is notable, as it relates to a recent line of work on
efficiency guarantees in auctions with reduced expressiveness. For example, the VCG mechanism
with reports restricted to be additive functions is precisely the “simultaneous single-item auction”
studied first by Christodoulou, Kova´cs and Schapira [8], then subsequently in a line of research
aimed at analyzing the efficiency of this mechanism under various classes of agent valuations [4,
17, 29, 35, 36, 12]. Our main result implies a price of anarchy bound on this auction format,
under a wide variety of payment rules, when agents’ true valuations are fractionally subadditive.
For this specific case of the VCG auction where agents are constrained to use a bidding language
more restrictive than the valuation space, price of anarchy bounds were independently obtained by
Du¨tting, Henzinger and Starnberger [11].
In the case that agents are able to express their true valuations (i.e., the type space and bidding
language are the same), our bounds on the efficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria hold even if the
distribution from which values are drawn exhibit correlations among agents. This is in contrast
with item bidding auctions, which have good efficiency if valuations of the agents are drawn from
independent distributions, but are known to perform very poorly in settings where the valuations
of the players are correlated [3, 12]. Underlying this fact is the phenomenon known as the exposure
problem – which refers to the fact in item bidding auctions, that agents can’t fully express their
valuations without exposing themselves to the risk of negative utility. Consider, for example, the
extreme case of an unit-demand player, i.e., a player that wants at most one item. He has to choose
between bidding high on multiple items and exposing himself to the risk of winning and paying for
more then one item, or rather place a “safe” bid and be severely constrained on how he can express
his preferences. Our results highlight that the ability of expressing your true value is crucial in
order to get equilibria with good efficiency in settings where valuations are drawn from correlated
distributions.
Other related work Other recent papers have studied Nash equilibria of games induced by mar-
ket mechanisms. Adsul et al [1] study the Nash equilibria of the game induced by the Linear Fisher
Market, showing existence of equilibrium and providing a complete polyhedral characterization in
some special cases. Chen, Deng, Zhang [6] and Chen, Deng, Zhang, Zhang [5] study incentive
ratios in Fisher Markets, i.e., they bound how much the utility of any given player can improve by
strategic play in comparison to his utility if he were to play truthfully. Markakis and Telelis [23]
and de Keijzer et al [9] study the Price of Anarchy of Uniform Price Auctions, which can be cast
as a game derived from a market equilibrium computation.
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2 Preliminaries
Notation Throughout the paper we will denote vectors by bold letters: p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ R
m
will denote a vector of prices over m items. Given a subset S ⊆ [m], we will denote by 1S the
indicator vector of set S. When S = [m], we will omit the subscript, i.e., 1 = 1[m] is the vector
where all components are 1. Similarly 0 = 1∅ is the vector of all zeros. Given two vectors x,y we will
denote by z = x∪y and w = x∩ y by the vectors such that zi = max{xi, yi} and wi = min{xi, yi}
respectively. Also, for binary vectors x ∈ {0, 1}m we say j ∈ x if xj = 1. We will also denote dot
products as follows: x · y =
∑
i xiyi.
Valuation functions will be represented by v : {0, 1}m → R+ such that v(0) = 0 and v(x) ≤ v(y)
whenever x ≤ y. Given a valuation function v, we define the demand at price vector p as Dv(p) =
argmaxx∈{0,1}m [v(x) − p · x]. Whenever convenient, we will see v as a function v : Z
m
+ → R+
such that v(x) = v(x ∩ 1). Given any function f : Zm+ → R+, we define marginal values as
f(y|x) = f(y + x)− f(x).
Classes of valuation functions A class of valuation functions is a subset of {v; v : {0, 1}m →
R+}. In what follows, we will consider various subsets of increasing level of complexity.
• Additive valuations: v ∈ Add if v(x) = w · x for some w ∈ Rm+ .
• Unit demand valuations: v ∈ Ud if v(x) = maxj∈xwj for some w ∈ R
m
+ .
• Gross substitutes valuations: v ∈ Gs if for any pair of prices p ≤ q, S = {j; pj = qj} and
x ∈ Dv(p) there is y ∈ Dv(q) such that 1S ≤ y.
• Submodular valuations: v ∈ Sm if for any x,y ∈ {0, 1}m, v(x) + v(y) ≥ v(x ∪ y) + v(x ∩ y).
An equivalent definition is that for all x ∩ y = 0 and z ≤ y then v(x|z) ≥ v(x|y).
• XOS valuations: v ∈ Xos if there is a set I and a set of vectors {wi}i∈I such that v(x) =
maxi∈I wi · x.
It is known that (Add ∪Ud) ( Gs ( Sm ( Xos. We refer to Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan
[21] for a more extensive discussion on the relation between such classes. One important property
of those classes is the closure with respect to the OR (∨) operator. Given a set of valuations {vi},
we define ∨ivi : Z
m
+ → R+ as: (∨ivi)(x) = max{
∑
i vi(xi);
∑
i xi ≤ x,xi ≤ 1}. In other words, the
value of the OR of multiple agents’ valution functions evaluated at x is the value of the optimal
partition of the goods in x among the agents. Notice that the function is defined over the domain
of x ∈ Zm+ so to allow the optimal partition that allocated item j at most xj times.
We say that a valuation class is closed under the OR operator when given any valuations
v1, . . . , vn in the class, the valuation ∨ivi restricted to {0, 1}
m is also in the class. It is known from
[21, 24] that the classes Add, Gs and Xos are closed under the OR operator.
Market economy Consider a market with n agents and m goods, each agent with a valuation
vi : {0, 1}
m → R+ over the set of goods and quasi-linear utilities, i.e., the utility of agent i to
be allocated a bundle xi ∈ {0, 1}
m for a total payment of πi is ui = vi(xi) − πi. A Walrasian
equilibrium in such market is a vector of prices p ∈ Rm+ and a partition of the goods into disjoint
bundles 1 =
∑
i xi such that for each player i, xi ∈ Dvi(p). The First Welfare Theorem states
that whenever a Walrasian equilibrium exists, it maximizes welfare, i.e., the partition maximizes∑
i vi(xi). We call a vector p ∈ R
m
+ Walrasian prices if there is an allocation that paired with such
vector forms a Walrasian equilibrium. The Second Welfare Theorem states that given any partition
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of the items yi maximizing
∑
i vi(yi) and any vector of Walrasian prices p, the pair composed of
this vector and those allocations is a Walrasian equilibrium.
A classical result due to Kelso and Crawford [20] guarantees the existence of Walrasian equilibria
if the valuation functions are gross substitutes. Gul and Stachetti [15] show that this condition is
in some sense necessary: gross substitutes is the largest class of valuation functions containing
unit-demand valuations for which a Walrasian equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist.
Gul and Stachetti [15] also show that the set of Walrasian prices forms a lattice, i.e., for any
valuations v1, . . . , vn ∈ Gs, if p and p
′ are Walrasian prices for such valuations, then p∩p′ and p∪p′
are also Walrasian prices. This implies in particular that there exist Walrasian price vectors p and
p such that for all Walrasian prices p, it is the case that p ≤ p ≤ p. The existence proof in Kelso
and Crawford [20] is constructive and yields a simple and natural ascending price procedure called
Walrasian taˆtonnement that computes a Walrasian equilibrium. Later in [16], Gul and Stachetti
argue that this procedure produces the equilibrium corresponding to the lowest point in the lattice,
i.e., with prices p.
Both price vectors p and p have a clean description in terms of the welfare function. Associate
with v = (v1, . . . , vn), the function W
v : Zm+ → R+ given by W
v(x) = (∨ivi)(x). Gul and Stachetti
[15] show that p and p can be calculated by the following closed-form formulas:
p
j
= W v(1j |1) pj = W
v(1j |1− 1j).
In other words, the price p
j
is the extra benefit for society for an additional copy of item j. The
price pj is how much harm to the welfare of the society removing item j will cause.
Auction games We want to consider the market economy as a strategic game, following the
model proposed by Hurwicz [18]. Before we do that, we define a generic auction game and propose
how to study its equilibria. The setting is composed of m items and n agents with valuations vi in
a certain valuation space V. A game for such setting consists of a bidding space B and allocation
and payment functions:
xi : B
n → {0, 1}m πi : B
n → R+
The allocation is supposed to be such that
∑
i xi(b) ≤ 1 for all b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ B
n. For this
paper, we will be interested in games such that the bidding language is a subset of the valuation
space, i.e., B ⊆ V. The utilities in such game are given by ui(vi;b) = vi(xi(b))− πi(b).
As an example, consider the case of the second price (i.e., Vickrey) auction for a single item.
This is an auction game in which m = 1, and where V = B = R+. The allocation rule is given by
xi = 1 if i has the highest bid (breaking ties lexicographically) and zero otherwise. The payment
rule is given by πi = maxj 6=i bj whenever xi = 1, and zero otherwise.
We will study auction games in two different settings, non-Bayesian and Bayesian. We also refer
to the non-Bayesian setting as the full information setting.
Nash equilibria and Price of Anarchy We are interested in studying the Nash equilibria of
such games, i.e., for v ∈ Vn:
Nash(v) = {b ∈ Bn;ui(vi;b) ≥ ui(vi; b
′
i,b−i),∀i ∈ [n],∀b
′
i ∈ B}
In particular we are interested in measuring the social welfare in equilibriumW v(x(b)) =
∑
i vi(xi(b))
against the optimal welfare across all partitions of the items. The maximum and minimum of such
ratio are known as the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS):
PoA = max
v
max
b∈Nash(v)
∑
i vi(x
∗
i (v))∑
i vi(xi(b))
PoS = max
v
min
b∈Nash(v)
∑
i vi(x
∗
i (v))∑
i vi(xi(b))
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where x∗i (v) is the allocation maximizing
∑
i vi(x
∗
i (v)). Note that if Nash(v) = ∅, both the price
of anarchy and the price of stability are defined to be 1.
Bayesian Equilibria and Bayesian Price of Anarchy If the valuation space in endowed with
a distribution D over Vn (which need not be independent between agents), one can study auction
games as Bayesian games. For such games the strategy of each player is a mapping bi : V → B and
the set of Bayes Nash equilibria are given by:
BNash(D) = {(bi : V → B)i=1..n;ED[ui(vi;b(v))|vi] ≥ ED[ui(vi; b
′
i,b−i(v−i))|vi],∀i ∈ [n],∀b
′
i ∈ B}
and the corresponding notions of Bayesian Price of Anarchy and Bayesian Price of Stability are
given by:
BPoA = max
D
max
b∈BNash(D)
ED[
∑
i vi(x
∗
i (v))]
ED[
∑
i vi(xi(b(v)))]
BPoS = max
D
min
b∈BNash(D)
ED[
∑
i vi(x
∗
i (v))]
ED
∑
i vi(xi(b(v)))]
Exposure factor Even for the single-item second price auction in the full information setting
(and more generally for the VCG mechanism), it is not possible to give any reasonable bound for
PoA due to the so called bullying equilibria. Consider a setting with a single items and two agents
with values v1 = 1 and v2 = ǫ for this item. The bids b1 = 0 and b2 = 10 form a Nash equilibrium
with welfare ǫ while the optimal welfare is 1. Although this is an equilibrium, it is based on an
aggressive bid by agent 2 which exposes him to loss; agent 2 can end up with negative utility if
agent 1 was to change his bid to 1. In order to get around the issue of bullying that is based on
large exposure, we define what we call the exposure factor, which quantifies the amount of risk an
agent with type vi is exposing himself to by bidding bi. We say that the strategy bi has exposure
factor γ if:
πi(bi,b−i) ≤ (1 + γ) · vi(xi(bi,b−i)),∀b−i ∈ B
n
We will call a strategy with γ = 0 a non-exposure strategy, since for any bids of the other agents,
agent i is guaranteed to have non-negative utility. Therefore, we will be interested in bounding the
Price of Anarchy across equilibria with γ exposure, i.e.:
Nashγ(v) = {b ∈ Nash(v); bi has γ exposure factor for all i}
We define PoAγ ,PoSγ by simply substituting Nash by Nashγ in the definition. Analogously, we
can defineBNashγ as b ∈ BNash(D) such that Eviπi(bi(vi),b−i(vi)) ≤ (1+γ)·Evivi(xi(bi(vi),b−i(vi)))
for any function b−i : V → B
n−1. Analogously, we can also define BPoAγ and BPoSγ . As before,
each of the above measures of the price of anarchy and the price of stability are taken to be 1
whenever the corresponding set of equilibria is empty.
It is worth noting that for the case of single item second price auction, a common way to get
around bullying equilibria is to note that it is a weakly dominated strategy for an agent to bid above
his valuation. This, however, is not necessarily true for other auction formats (like item bidding)
where agents bid on multiple items. Correspondingly, much of the prior literature on auction games
for multiple items [4, 8, 12, 37] has imposed some form of a “bounded overbidding” assumption on
players’ strategies at equilibrium.
Walrasian mechanism We define a Walrasian mechanism as a game where we ask each agent
to report a valuation bi ∈ B function and compute a Walrasian equilibrium of the reported market.
In other words, xi : B
n → {0, 1}m and πi : B
n → R+ is a Walrasian mechanism if there is a price
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function p : Bn → Rm+ such that: (i) πi(b) = p(b) · xi(b) and (ii) (x(b),p(b)) is a Walrasian
equilibrium of the market defined by b = (b1, . . . , bn).
It is known that, in general, Walrasian equilibria might not exist. However, if B ⊆ Gs, then a
Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Moreover, because Walrasian prices form a lattice,
we will be interested in two distinct flavors of the Walrasian mechanism for gross substitutes:
• English Walrasian Mechanism: This is the mechanism that implements the lower point of
the lattice of Walrasian prices. Formally, it allocates according to the optimal allocation with
respect to declared values b and charges πi(b) =
∑
j∈xi
Wb(1j |1). This mechanism is also
called English Auctions with Differentiated Commodities by Gul and Stacchetti [16]. For the
special case of one item, it corresponds to the second price / English auction.
• Dutch Walrasian Mechanism: This is the mechanism that implements the higher point of the
lattice of Walrasian prices. Formally, it allocates according to the optimal allocation with
respect to declared values b and charges πi(b) =
∑
j∈xi
Wb(1j |1− 1j). For the special case
of one item, it corresponds to the first price / Dutch auction.
Also, for the special case where B = Add, these mechanisms are equivalent to the second- and
first-price item bidding auctions, respectively, as studied in [4, 8, 12, 37].
We note that, like the simultaneous item bidding auctions described above, strategies that
includes overbidding (i.e., declaring more than one’s true value for certain sets of goods) are not
necessarily weakly dominated in the Walrasian mechanism. An example is given in Appendix A.
Declared Welfare Maximizers A general class of auction games that includes the Walrasian
mechanism is called the declared welfare maximizers. We say that a mechanism is a declared welfare
maximizer if x1(b), . . . ,xn(b) is a partition of the set of items maximizing
∑
i bi(xi). In order for the
bi to have the semantics of maximum willingness to pay for a bundle, we enforce the following two
properties over the payment function: (i) πi(b) ≤ bi(xi(b)), i.e., no agent pays for a bundle more
then his declared value for this bundle, and (ii) for any b there is b′−i such that xi(b) = xi(bi,b
′
−i)
and πi(bi,b
′
−i) = bi(xi(b)), i.e., for any bid on a subset, there is a set of bids of the other players
such that player i will pay his bid on his allocated subset.
It is simple to see that the Walrasian mechanism is a declared welfare maximizer. We also
consider the following other declared welfare maximizers:
• VCG Mechanism: The mechanism allocates according to the optimal declared allocation and
charges agents according to the externality they impose on the other players. Formally, we
have: πi = W
b
−i(xi|1− xi).
• Pay-Your-Bid Mechanism: The mechanism allocates according to the optimal declared allo-
cation and charges the bids, i.e., πi = bi(xi).
The following observation about declared welfare maximizers follows immediately from the def-
initions:
Observation 2.1 (Bounded Overbidding) Consider a declared welfare maximizer mechanism
and agents with valuations v1, . . . , vn. If bi is a strategy with exposure factor γ, then: bi(xi(b)) ≤
(1 + γ)vi(xi(b)). In the Bayesian setting, exposure factor γ translates to ED[bi(xi(b))] ≤ (1 +
γ)ED[vi(xi(b))]
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3 Existence of Efficient and Inefficient Equilibria
In this section we first argue that in the non-Bayesian setting, both the English and Dutch versions of
the Walrasian equilibria have Nash equilibria that are efficient and only use non-exposure strategies,
implying that the Price of Stability is 1. After that we show that they also often have inefficient
equilibria as well. This is also true for the VCG mechanism.
Lemma 3.1 If v is a valuation profile consisting of gross substitute valuations, the English Wal-
rasian mechanism has pure and efficient Nash equilibria that employ only non-exposure strategies.
Proof : Let p ∈ Rm+ be a vector of Walrasian prices for the market economy defined by v and
let (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
n) be the corresponding optimal allocation. Such prices exist since the valuations are
gross substitute. We first prove the claim assuming that pj > 0 for all j ∈ [m]. Consider the
following bids bi(y) = p · (x
∗
i ∩ y). In other words, each agent submits an additive bid in which
he bids on each item he wins in the optimal allocation exactly its Walrasian price. Clearly the
mechanism allocates x∗i to player i, which is an efficient allocation. Now, we need to show that this
strategy is non-exposure and that this is a Nash equilibrium.
Non-exposure: Since the payment of the Walrasian mechanism for a bundle is at most the bid
on this bundle, it is enough to show that bi(y) ≤ vi(y) on any y ∈ {0, 1}
m. Fix any y ∈ {0, 1}m
and let z = x∗i ∩ y. Now, bi(y) = p · z by the definition of bi. Also since x
∗
i is the set maximizing
player i’s utility under prices p we know that: vi(x
∗
i )−p · x
∗
i ≥ vi(x
∗
i − z)−p · (x
∗
i − z), therefore:
vi(y) ≥ vi(z) ≥ vi(x
∗
i )− vi(x
∗
i − z) ≥ p · z = bi(y)
Nash equilibrium: Under bids b the payment of the English Walrasian mechanism are zero,
since no two players bid on the same item. Therefore ui(vi;b) = vi(x
∗
i ). Now, consider a deviation
of player i to some bid b′i and let y = xi(b
′
i,b−i). By the definition of prices in the English
Walrasian auction, the price of each item in y but not in x∗i is at least pj, so ui(vi; b
′
i,b−i) ≤
vi(y)− p · (y− y ∩ x
∗
i ) ≤ vi(y)− p · y+ p · x
∗
i . Since vi(x
∗
i )− p · x
∗
i
≥ vi(y)− p · y, we have that:
ui(vi; b
′
i,b−i) ≤ vi(x
∗
i ) = ui(vi;b).
The assumption that pj > 0 made in the proof can be easily removed by slightly changing bids
bi to bid an infinitesimally small amount ǫ on each item in x
∗
i that has price zero and for which i
has positive marginal value.
Corollary 3.2 The Price of Stability of the English Walrasian auction is 1.
The same arguments can be made about the Dutch Walrasian auction, yet one needs to be
careful how to deal with tie breaking rules. The adaptation from the previous proof from the
English to the Dutch Walrasian mechanism follows exactly the same arguments in Hassidim et al
[17] for proving the existence of efficient equilibria in first-price item bidding auctions with gross
substitute valuations.
Now, we show two examples of inefficient equilibria of the Walrasian mechanism. The first
example highlights the incentives to perform demand reduction, i.e., to declare less value than he
actually has. This is in line with the observation of Rustichini et al [33] that demand reduction is
a common practice in bargaining.
Example 3.3 (Incentives to reduce demand) Consider a market with two agents and two items.
The first agent is unit demand with value 1+ ǫ per item and the second agent is additive with value
2 per item. Formally v1(x) = (1 + ǫ)max{x1, x2} and v2(x) = 2(x1 + x2).
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If agents report truthfully in the English Walrasian mechanism, items are both priced at 1+ǫ and
agent 2 acquires both, getting utility 2 − 2ǫ. Agent 2, however, can improve his utility by changing
his bid to b′2(x) = 2x1, without exposing himself. Now, he only acquires the first item, but Walrasian
prices are zero, giving him utility u′2 = 2 > u2.
This produces a Nash equilibrium of welfare 3, while the optimal allocation has welfare 4, showing
that PoA0 ≥ 4/3 for English Walrasian Mechanism.
Example 3.4 (Inefficiency due to Miscoordination) Now, we consider a 2 lower bound on
the Price of Anarchy due to miscoordination. Consider two items A,B and two unit demand agents
1, 2 with valuations v1(x) = max{(2 − ǫ)xA, xB} and v2(x) = max{xA, (2 − ǫ)xB}. Consider now
the following equilibrium in which both agents miscoordinate and bid a high amount on their least
favorite item and zero on their preferred item: b1(x) = xB and b2(x) = xA. Both items get priced
at zero under such declarations, agent 1 is allocated item B and agent 2 is allocated item A. This
is a Nash equilibrium since the utility of each agent is 1 and by deviating his value can increase by
at most 1− ǫ but if this happens, his payment will increase by at least 1. The welfare in equilibrium
is 2, while the optimal allocation has welfare 4− 2ǫ. This shows that PoA0 ≥ 2.
For γ > 0, consider agents with valuations v1(x) = max{(2 − ǫ)xA,
2
2+γxB} and v2(x) =
max{ 22+γxA, (2 − ǫ)xB}. The bids b1(x) =
2(1+γ)
2+γ xB and b2(x) =
2(1+γ)
2+γ xA form an inefficient
equilibrium with exposure factor γ and welfare 42+γ while the optimal welfare is 4− 2ǫ. This implies
that PoAγ ≥ 2 + γ.
It is interesting to notice that in the previous example all valuations are unit-demand. In such
case, the outcome of the English Walrasian mechanism coincides with the VCG mechanism [16], in
which truthtelling is a dominant strategy. The example show that the truth being dominant, there
are other equilibria as well that generate inefficient outcomes. We will see that for the case of the
VCG auction, the bound above is essentially tight.
4 Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria
Given Examples 3.3 and 3.4, it is natural to ask how large the gap between the welfare of the
optimal allocation and the worse welfare of a Nash equilibrium of the Walrasian mechanism can
be made. Our main result is an upper bound on such ratio that holds for any declared welfare
maximizer, in particular, any flavor of the Walrasian mechanism, the VCG mechanism and the first
price mechanism. This bounds depends only on the exposure factor and holds even the Bayesian
setting (even with correlated distributions) and doesn’t depend on number of players, number of
items or any characteristic of the distribution. Notice in particular the following theorems doesn’t
make any sort of large market assumptions.
First start by presenting the statement of our results, starting with its version for gross substitute
valuations and then discussing extensions to the more general class of Xos valuation. And a
specialization of this result for the VCG mechanism. Proofs are left for the following subsections.
Theorem 4.1 If V = B = Gs and the mechanism is a declared welfare maximizer, i.e., allocates
according to the optimal partition of items with respect to the bids, then PoAγ ≤ 4 + 2γ.
The following theorem is a strict generalization of the previous for Bayesian settings. Theorem
4.1 can be recovered as a special case of its Bayesian counterpart Theorem 4.2 by taking the
distribution concentrated on a single valuation profile. The following proof follows from smoothness
arguments [31, 32, 37, 22] and therefore generalizes also to other equilibrium concepts such as mixed
Nash, coarse correlated equilibria and outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics.
9
Theorem 4.2 If V = B = Gs and V is endowed with a (possibly correlated) probability distribution
D, then BPoAγ ≤ 4 + 2γ.
Next, we extend Theorem 4.2 to allow the larger class of Xos valuations (that contains, in
particular, all submodular valuations). This extension comes at the cost of a slightly weaker bound
on the price of anarchy.
Theorem 4.3 If V = B = Xos and the mechanism is a declared welfare maximizer then BPoAγ ≤
6 + 4γ.
For the special case of the VCG mechanism, we further improve the bound, matching the lower
bound in Example 3.4:
Theorem 4.4 If V = B = Gs, then for the VCG mechanism, BPoAγ ≤ 2 + γ. If V = B = Xos,
then for the VCG mechanism, BPoAγ ≤ 3 + 2γ.
As in Theorem 4.2, the above results follow from smoothness arguments, and therefore generalize
to mixed Nash equilibria, coarse correlated equilibria, and outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics.
Moreover, since pure Nash equilibria are a special case of Bayes-Nash equilibria, the bounds on
BPoAγ also apply to PoAγ .
In the previous results, we assumed that all valuations v ∈ V could be represented in the bidding
language B. It is often useful to restrict the bidding language for various reasons:
• representation and communication: very expressive combinatorial valuations like Xos require
many bits to be expressed. It might be desirable to restrict to a simpler class, as additive,
unit demand or a simple combination of those, for which the valuation can be more simply
represented and communicated.
• computational efficiency : there are computationally efficient algorithms to find the optimal
allocation when bids are gross substitutes [14] but it is computationally hard to compute the
optimal allocation for general submodular and Xos valuations
• simplicity : a simpler bidding language might lead to simpler and more intuitive design to
agents. A prime example of such approach are item bidding auctions.
We show that the results for Nash equilibria presented above still hold for mechanisms with
restricted bidding languages, as long as agents are able to express additive valuations. These
bounds apply to Bayes-Nash equilibria as well, but we require that agent types be independent;
that is, the distribution D is such that for i 6= j, vi and vj are independent random variables.
Theorem 4.5 (Restricted bidding languages) Consider a declared welfare maximizer mecha-
nism with valuation space V and bidding language B. Then:
• if V ⊆ Xos and Add ⊆ B ⊆ Xos, then PoAγ ≤ 6 + 4γ.
• if V ⊆ Xos and Add ⊆ B ⊆ Gs, then PoAγ ≤ 4 + 2γ.
For the special case of the VCG mechanism, we can strengthen the bounds:
• if V ⊆ Xos and Add ⊆ B ⊆ Xos, then PoAγ ≤ 3 + 2γ.
• if V ⊆ Xos and Add ⊆ B ⊆ Gs, then PoAγ ≤ 2 + γ.
The bounds also hold for Bayes-Nash equilibria as long as the distribution from which valuations
are sampled is independent across agents.
10
4.1 Declared Efficiency Maximizers for gross substitute bidders
The following lemma that will be useful in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Recall the notation Wb(x) =
max{
∑
j bj(xj);
∑
j xj ≤ x} and W
b
−i(x) = max{
∑
j 6=i bj(xj);
∑
j xj ≤ x}.
Lemma 4.6 If b1, . . . , bn ∈ Gs, then for any partition xi of the items, i.e.
∑
i xi = 1, it holds that∑
iW
b
−i(xi|1− xi) ≤W
b(1)
Proof : A key observation is that the Gs is closed under the OR operator, so Wb and Wb−i
are gross substitutes and therefore submodular. Using this fact, we first show that Wb−i(xi|1 −
xi) ≤ W
b(xi|1 − xi). In order to see that, let yi be player i allocation in an optimal partition
of 1 − xi according to b, i.e, W
b(1 − xi) = bi(yi) + W
b
−i(1 − xi − yi). Notice that W
b(1) ≥
bi(yi) +W
b
−i(1− yi). Therefore, we have:
Wb(xi|1− xi) = W
b(1)−Wb(1− xi) ≥ [bi(yi) +W
b
−i(1− yi)]− [bi(yi) +W
b
−i(1− xi − yi)]
= Wb−i(xi|1− yi − xi) ≥W
b
−i(xi|1− xi)
where the last step follows from the submodularity of Wb−i . Now, we can apply submodularity of
Wb and a telescopic sum:
∑
iW
b
−i(xi|1− xi) ≤
∑
iW
b(xi|1− xi) ≤
∑
iW
b(xi|
∑
j<i xj) = W
b(1)
Proof of Theorem 4.1 : Fix a declared efficiency maximizer mechanism given by xi : Gs
n →
{0, 1}m and πi : Gs
n → R+ for i = 1, ..., n and a profile of Gs valuations v = (v1, . . . , vn) and let
b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Gs
n be a pure Nash equilibrium of this mechanism for the type profile defined
by v. Let x1, . . . ,xn be the allocation and (π1, . . . , πn) be the payments in this equilibrium. Also,
let x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
n be an allocation maximizing
∑
i vi(x
∗
i ).
Consider the utility of player i by deviating to b′i =
1
2vi and let x
′
i be his allocation under the bids
(b′i,b−i). By definition x
′
i maximizes
1
2vi(x
′
i)+W
b
−i(1−x′i). In particular:
1
2vi(x
′
i)+W
b
−i(1−x′i) ≥
1
2vi(x
∗
i ) +W
b
−i(1− x∗i ). Therefore we have:
ui(b
′
i,b−i) = vi(x
′
i)− πi(b
′
i,b−i) ≥ vi(x
′
i)−
1
2vi(x
′
i) =
1
2vi(x
′
i)
≥ 12vi(x
∗
i ) +W
b
−i(1− x∗i )−W
b
−i(1− x′i) ≥
≥ 12vi(x
∗
i ) +W
b
−i(1− x∗i )−W
b
−i(1) = 12vi(x
∗
i )−W
b
−i(x∗i |1− x
∗
i )
Summing over all agents i and using Lemma 4.6, we get:
∑
i
ui(b
′
i,b−i) ≥
1
2
vi(x
∗
i )−
∑
i
bi(xi)
Now, we observe that since this is a Nash equilibrium, ui(b
′
i,b−i) ≤ ui(b) ≤ vi(xi). Also, by
Observation 2.1 for exposure factor γ, bi(xi) ≤ (1 + γ)vi(xi). Therefore:
2(2 + γ)
∑
i
vi(xi) ≥
∑
i
vi(x
∗
i )
The proof of Theorem 4.1 can be adapted to the Bayesian setting using the quasi-smoothness
technique in Lucier and Paes Leme [22]. We reproduce it here for completeness:
11
Proof of Theorem 4.2 : Consider a Bayes-Nash equilibrium b = (b1, . . . , bn) where bi : V → B.
We know from the proof of Theorem 4.3 that each player has a deviation b′i(vi) =
1
2vi that depends
only on his valuation such that for every realization of v :
∑
i
ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i(v−i)) ≥
1
2
∑
i
vi(x
∗
i (v)) −
∑
i
bi(xi(b))
where x∗i (v) is the allocation of i in an optimal allocation with respect to the true valuations.
Taking expectations, we obtain:
∑
i
ED[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i(v−i))] ≥
1
2
∑
i
ED[vi(x
∗
i (v))] −
∑
i
ED[bi(xi(b))]
Since b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, we know that:
ED[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i(v−i))] = E[E[ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i(v−i))|vi]] ≤ E[E[ui(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))|vi]] = E[ui(b(v))]
Using the previous line as well as Observation 2.1, we get:
(4 + 2γ)ED[vi(xi(b(v)))] ≥ ED[vi(x
∗
i (v))]
4.2 Declared Efficiency Maximizers for XOS bidders
We note that the only point in the proof of Theorem 4.1 that we used that valuations are gross
substituted was inside Lemma 4.6 to argue that Wb is a submodular function. Even when bi are
submodular for all i, Wb might fail to be submodular [21]. To go around this problem, we prove a
version of Lemma 4.6 for the broader class of Xos valuations.
Lemma 4.7 If b1, . . . , bn ∈ Xos, then for any partition xi of the items, i.e.
∑
i xi = 1, it holds
that
∑
iW
b
−i(xi|1− xi) ≤ 2W
b(1)
Proof : Let xˆ1, . . . , xˆn be a partition maximizing the declared welfare, i.e.,
∑
i bi(xˆi) = W
b(1).
Since bi ∈ Xos there is a vector wi ∈ R
m
+ such that bi(xˆi) = wi · xˆi and for any y ∈ {0, 1}
m,
bi(y) ≥ wi · y. Therefore:
∑
i
Wb−i(xi|1− xi) =
∑
i
[
Wb−i(1)−Wb−i(1− xi)
]
≤
∑
i

Wb−i(1) −
∑
k 6=i
bk(xˆk ∩ (1− xi))


where the last inequality follows from the fact thatWb−i(1−xi) is the value of the optimal allocation
of 1 − xi to agents k 6= i and
∑
k 6=i bk(xˆk ∩ (1 − xi)) is the value of a particular allocation. Now,
we can bound the value of bk(xˆk ∩ (1− xi)) using the wk vectors:∑
i
∑
k 6=i
bk(xˆk ∩ (1− xi)) ≥
∑
i
∑
k 6=i
wk · (xˆk ∩ (1− xi)) ≥ (n− 2)
∑
i
wi · xˆi = (n− 2)
∑
i
bi(xˆi)
since for each k there are n−1 terms of type wk · (xˆk ∩ (1−xi)) and each term in wk · xˆk appears in
all but one of them, since each term corresponds to an item j ∈ xˆk and appears in all terms except
the one for which j ∈ xi. Therefore, we have:∑
i
Wb−i(xi|1− xi) ≤
∑
i
Wb−i(1)− (n − 2)Wb(1) ≤ 2 ·Wb(1)
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4.3 Efficiency of Equilibria for the VCG mechanism
We next show how to improve our bounds on the efficiency of equilibria, for the particular case of
the VCG mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 4.4 : Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) be a valuation profile and b a Nash equilibrium
of the VCG mechanism. Let also x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
n be an optimal allocation with respect to the true
valuations. We consider a deviation where player i bids his true value instead:
ui(b) ≥ ui(vi,b−i) = vi(xi(vi,b−i))−W
b
−i(xi(vi,b−i)|1− xi(vi,b−i)) =
= vi(xi(vi,b−i)) +W
b
−i(1− xi(vi,b−i))−W
b
−i(1)
≥ vi(x
∗
i ) +W
b
−i(1− x∗i )−W
b
−i(1) = vi(x
∗
i )−W
b
−i(x∗i |1− x
∗
i )
Summing for all agents i and applying Lemma 4.7 in case of Xos valuations and Lemma 4.6 in case
of Gs valuations, we get the desired bound. The extension to the Bayesian case follows the exact
same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
4.4 Restricted Bidding Languages
Finally, we now analyze equilibria of welfare-maximizing mechanisms when the bidding language is
not necessarily identical to the agents’ type space, but is rather assumed only to be a subset of the
type space that includes the set of additive valuation functions.
Proof of Theorem 4.5 : The proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.1 required that a player with
valuation vi ∈ V was able to bid bi =
1
2vi ∈ B . Looking closer, one realizes that in fact, there
only needs to exist a bid b′i ∈ B with the following property: b
′
i(xi) ≤
1
2b
′
i(xi) for all xi ∈ {0, 1}
m
and b′i(x
∗
i ) =
1
2b
′
i(x
∗
i ), where (x
∗
1, . . . ,x
∗
n) is an optimal allocation with respect to bids. A simple
observation is that if vi ∈ Xos, then there is such bid b
′
i ∈ Add. Notice that vi(x) = maxj∈I wj ·x,
so for some j ∈ I, vi(x
∗
i ) = wj · x
∗
i , so simply take b
′
i(x) =
1
2wj · xi.
For VCG instead of declared welfare maximizers, one can use the same argument without the
half factor, i.e., one needs a deviating bid such that b′i(xi) ≤ b
′
i(xi) for all xi ∈ {0, 1}
m and
b′i(x
∗
i ) = b
′
i(x
∗
i ). One can simply take b
′
i(x) = wj · xi.
The arguments used in the proof of Theorem 4.2 to extend Theorem 4.1 to the Bayesian case
rely on the deviation b′i =
1
2vi depending only on the type of i. In the above proof, however, the
deviation b′i(xi) = wi · xi depends not only on vi but also on x
∗
i , which is a function of the entire
valuation profile v. Using the technique recently introduced by Syrgkanis and Tardos [37], however,
one can obtain Price of Anarchy bounds in the Bayesian setting from ”smoothness-type” proofs for
the case where the distribution over valuations is independent across agents.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism when agents strategically report their
demands. It is known from Jackson and Manelli [19], Roberts and Postelwaite [30] and recently
Azevedo and Budish [2] that in the limit as the market grows large, the players have little incentive
to misreport their true demand and therefore the equilibrium approaches the market outcome with
respect to the true preferences. In this paper, we analyze the small market regime, which models
situations where the market is very specialized with few players or the market has a few major
players whose transactions considerably affect the prices. Such situations are not uncommon in
niches of the financial market, for example.
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Without any assumptions on size of the market or on the distributions under which valuations
are drawn, we show a bound on the efficiency of the market, measured in terms of the ratio between
the optimal welfare and the welfare of the worst Nash equilibria. We show, however, that the
efficiency crucially depend on a parameter that measures the amount of ”risk” players are willing
to expose themselves, which we call the exposure factor.
Our results are extended to the broader class of declared welfare maximizer mechanisms, which
are mechanism that elicit bids from the agents in form or valuations over the items and allocate
according to the optimal allocation in the declared market and charges prices that are at most the
bids. Besides the Walrasian mechanism, this includes also the VGC mechanism and the pay-your-
bid mechanism.
For mechanisms such as VCG and pay-your-bid, it is clearly dominated to employ strategies
with exposure factor γ > 0. So under elimination of weakly dominated strategies, our bounds
hold with γ = 0 for such mechanisms. We also show that the same is not true for the Walrasian
mechanism. We leave as an open question if there is some γ > 0 for which strategies with exposure
factor γ are dominated.
Certain classes of valuations such as submodular or Xos are so rich that don’t allow for compu-
tationally efficient methods to reach the optimal allocation. We discuss one option to get around
this problem in the paper: restrict the class of valuations that agents can submit as bids. We show
that our results still holds if the restricted bidding language contains at lease additive valuations.
An alternative solution would be to compute an approximately optimal allocation, say using the
procedures of Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan [21] or Fu, Kleinberg and Lavi [13]. We believe an in-
teresting open problem arising from this work is how to extend our results to approximate declared
welfare maximizers.
References
[1] B. Adsul, C. S. Babu, J. Garg, R. Mehta, and M. A. Sohoni. Nash equilibria in fisher market.
In SAGT, pages 30–41, 2010.
[2] E. M. Azevedo and E. Budish. Strategyproofness in the large as a desideratum for market
design. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, page 55, 2012.
[3] K. Bhawalkar. Approximation Guarantees for Game Theoretical Equilibria. PhD thesis, Stan-
ford University, June 2013.
[4] K. Bhawalkar and T. Roughgarden. Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item
bidding. In SODA, pages 700–709, 2011.
[5] N. Chen, X. Deng, H. Zhang, and J. Zhang. Incentive ratios of fisher markets. In ICALP (2),
pages 464–475, 2012.
[6] N. Chen, X. Deng, and J. Zhang. How profitable are strategic behaviors in a market? In ESA,
pages 106–118, 2011.
[7] Y. K. Cheung, R. Cole, and N. R. Devanur. Tatonnement beyond gross substitutes?: gradient
descent to the rescue. In STOC, pages 191–200, 2013.
[8] G. Christodoulou, A. Kova´cs, and M. Schapira. Bayesian combinatorial auctions. In ICALP
(1), pages 820–832, 2008.
14
[9] B. de Keijzer, E. Markakis, G. Scha¨fer, and O. Telelis. On the inefficiency of standard multi-unit
auctions. CoRR, abs/1303.1646, 2013.
[10] G. Demange, D. Gale, and M. Sotomayor. Multi-item auctions. Journal of Political Economy,
94(4):863–72, August 1986.
[11] P. Dutting, M. Henzinger, and M. Starnberger. Valuation compressions in vcg-based combina-
torial auctions. In WINE, 2013.
[12] M. Feldman, H. Fu, N. Gravin, and B. Lucier. Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. In
STOC, pages 201–210, 2013.
[13] H. Fu, R. Kleinberg, and R. Lavi. Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price
processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. In ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce, page 586, 2012.
[14] S. Fujishige and A. Tamura. A two-sided discrete-concave market with possibly bounded side
payments: An approach by discrete convex analysis. Mathematics of Operations Research,
32(1):pp. 136–155, 2007.
[15] F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes. Journal of Economic
Theory, 87(1):95–124, July 1999.
[16] F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. The english auction with differentiated commodities. J. Economic
Theory, 92(1):66–95, 2000.
[17] A. Hassidim, H. Kaplan, Y. Mansour, and N. Nisan. Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete
goods. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 295–296, 2011.
[18] L. Hurwicz. On Informationally Decentralized Systems. In C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, edi-
tors, Decision and Organization: A volume in Honor of Jacob Marschak, volume 12 of Studies
in Mathematical and Managerial Economics, chapter 14, pages 297–336. North-Holland, Am-
sterdam, 1972.
[19] M. O. Jackson and A. M. Manelli. Approximate competitive equilibria in large economies. Dis-
cussion Papers 1101, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics
and Management Science, Sept. 1994.
[20] A. Kelso and V. Crawford. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. Econo-
metrica, 50(6):1483–1504, November 1982.
[21] B. Lehmann, D. J. Lehmann, and N. Nisan. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal
utilities. Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2):270–296, 2006.
[22] B. Lucier and R. Paes Leme. Gsp auctions with correlated types. In ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, pages 71–80, 2011.
[23] E. Markakis and O. Telelis. Uniform price auctions: Equilibria and efficiency. In SAGT, pages
227–238, 2012.
[24] K. Murota. Convexity and steinitz’s exchange property. Advances in Mathematics, 124(2):272
– 311, 1996.
15
[25] K. Murota and A. Tamura. New characterizations of m-convex functions and their applications
to economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 131(2):495
– 512, 2003. ¡ce:title¿Submodularity¡/ce:title¿.
[26] N. Nisan and I. Segal. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting
prices. J. Economic Theory, 129(1):192–224, 2006.
[27] Y. Otani and J. Sicilian. Equilibrium allocations of walrasian preference games. Journal of
Economic Theory, 27(1):47–68, June 1982.
[28] Y. Otani and J. Sicilian. Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of walrasian strategic
games. Journal of Economic Theory, 51(2):295–312, August 1990.
[29] R. Paes Leme, V. Syrgkanis, and E´. Tardos. Sequential auctions and externalities. In SODA,
pages 869–886, 2012.
[30] D. J. Roberts and A. Postlewaite. The incentives for price-taking behavior in large exchange
economies. Econometrica, 44(1):115–27, January 1976.
[31] T. Roughgarden. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. In STOC, pages 513–522, 2009.
[32] T. Roughgarden. The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information. In ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce, pages 862–879, 2012.
[33] A. Rustichini, M. A. Satterthwaite, and S. R. Williams. Convergence to efficiency in a simple
market with incomplete information. Econometrica, 62(5):1041–63, September 1994.
[34] M. A. Satterthwaite and S. R. Williams. The optimality of a simple market mechanism.
Econometrica, 70(5):1841–1863, September 2002.
[35] V. Syrgkanis. Bayesian games and the smoothness framework. CoRR, abs/1203.5155, 2012.
[36] V. Syrgkanis and E´. Tardos. Bayesian sequential auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, pages 929–944, 2012.
[37] V. Syrgkanis and E´. Tardos. Composable and efficient mechanisms. In STOC, pages 211–220,
2013.
[38] L. Walras. Elements of Pure Economics: Or the Theory of Social Wealth. Elements of Pure
Economics, Or the Theory of Social Wealth. Taylor & Francis, 2003.
A Overbidding
In this appendix we present an example in which a bidder has a strict preference for declaring
more than his true value on a set of goods, in the English Walrasian mechanism. This establishes
that such “overbidding” strategies are not weakly dominated in this mechanism. Our example will
consist of 3 players and 3 items. When two of the players honestly report their values, the third
player will be incentivized to overbid on one set. He does so to artificially inflate his welfare in
various allocations, which reduces the price he must pay for different goods.
The valuations of the three players are as follows:
• v1(x) = 4x1 + 2max{x2, x3}
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• v2(x) = 2max{x1, x2}
• v1(x) = x3
The optimal allocation is x1 = 1{1,3}, x2 = 1{2}, and x3 = 0, for a social welfare of 8. Further-
more, the English Walrasian mechanism sets prices pj = 1 for each j ∈ [3]; to see this, recall that
the minimum Walrasian price vector is given by p
j
= W v(1j |1), and note that under the addition
of an extra copy of any item the optimal allocation would generate social welfare 9. Thus, under a
profile of truthful reports, the utility of agent 1 is 4.
Now, consider a deviation in which player A declares valuation b′1, given by
b′1(x) = 4 · x1 +max{2x2, 3x3}.
This declaration overbids on sets {1, 3} and {3}. Under valuation profile (b′1,v−1), the optimal
allocation remains unchanged: it is x1 = 1{1,3}, x2 = 1{2}, and x3 = 0. However, the Walrasian
prices under this declaration profile are given by p1 = 0, p2 = 0, p3 = 1, since neither an extra copy
of item 1 nor 2 would lead to an optimal allocation with increased reported welfare. Thus, under
declared profile (b′1,v−1), the utility of agent 1 is 6, which is optimal over the space of possible
declarations for agent 1. We conclude that declaration b′1 is not weakly dominated for agent 1 when
his true valuation is v1. In particular, not all “overbidding” strategies are weakly dominated.
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